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Abstract 
 
The state of practice in the modelling of heterogeneous preferences does not separate the effects of scale from 
estimated mean and standard deviation preference measures. This restriction could lead to divergent behavioural 
implications relative to a flexible modelling structure that accounts for scale effects independently of estimated 
distributions of preference measures. The generalised multinomial logit (GMNL) model is such an econometric 
tool, enabling the analyst to identify the role that scale plays in impacting estimated sample mean and standard 
deviation preference measures, including confirming whether the appropriate model form approaches standard 
cases such as mixed logit. The GMNL model is applied in this paper to compare the behavioural implications of 
the minimum information group inference (MIGI) model within a study of interdependent road freight 
stakeholders in Sydney, Australia. MIGI estimates within GMNL models are compared with extant mixed logit 
measures (see Hensher and Puckett, 2008) to confirm whether the implications of the restrictive (with respect to 
scale) mixed logit model are consistent to those from the more flexible GMNL model. The results confirm the 
overall implication that transporters appear to hold relative power over supply chain responses to variable road-
user charges. However, the GMNL model identifies a broader range of potential group decision-making 
outcomes and a restricted set of attributes over which heterogeneity in group influence is found than the mixed 
logit model. Hence, this analysis offers evidence that failing to account for scale heterogeneity may result in 
inaccurate representations of the bargaining set, and the nature of preference heterogeneity, in general. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A 2004 choice study of interdependent road freight stakeholders in Sydney yielded 
important estimates of preference and relative influence in freight decision-making groups 
(see Hensher and Puckett, 2007, 2008). These estimates were obtained through the use of a 
series of generalised mixed logit models that incorporated distributional assumptions on the 
heterogeneous preferences of respondents. Whilst the modelling techniques in the study were 
advanced relative to the state of practice in general, Fiebig et al. (2010) raise an important 
question of direct relevance to the policy implications of the study. That is, how would the 
conclusions reached in the study change if preference heterogeneity were estimated within a 
framework that explicitly accounts for scale heterogeneity? 
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The generalised multinomial logit (GMNL) model (see Keane, 2006) allows for the 
simultaneous estimation of preference heterogeneity (i.e., random parameter distributions) 
and scale effects. This represents a powerful means of controlling for scale effects that are 
assumed within other modelling structures, including mixed logit. Specifically, the GMNL 
model represents variable scale effects separate to mean and standard deviation parameters 
for randomly-distributed explanatory variables. Due to the GMNL model’s general form, 
more restrictive models such as mixed logit and multinomial logit can be represented as 
subsets of GMNL models within which the estimated scale parameter takes particular values. 
In this paper, we estimate GMNL models of choices made by buyers and sellers of freight 
transport services in Sydney under a hypothetical road user charging system. The estimates 
from this model are then carried forward into a GMNL model of freight group decision-
making structures, yielding estimates of the relative influence supply chain members have 
with respect to the attributes in the choice study. The results from this analysis are compared 
to the results found under a generalised mixed logit model. We demonstrate the potential 
gains in goodness-of-fit and changes in behavioural inference that can be reached through 
calibrating scale effects directly.  
The discussion begins with an overview of the GMNL model in Section 2. Section 3 offers 
a description of the econometric group decision-making modelling structure that forms the 
centre of the analysis, minimum information group inference (MIGI). The empirical data are 
introduced in Section 4, followed by the empirical analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of the use of the GMNL model within independent and 
interdependent group choice applications. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Models Allowing for Preference Heterogeneity  
 
Let 
ntjU  denote the utility of alternative j perceived by respondent n in choice situation t. 
ntjU  consists of two components, a modelled component ntjV  and an unobserved component 
,nsj such that 
 
 ntj ntj ntjU V U   (1) 
 
As is common practice, we assume the modelled component of utility to be represented as 
a linear relationship of k attributes, x, related to each of the j alternatives and corresponding 
parameters weights such that  
 
 
1
K
ntj n nk ntjk ntj
k
U x  

   (2) 
 
where  nk  represents the marginal utility or parameter weight associated with attribute k 
for respondent n and the unobserved component, εntj is assumed to be independently and 
identically (IID) extreme value type 1 (EV1) distributed. n  represents a scale factor that is 
typically normalised to one in most applications. As well as containing information on the 
levels of the attributes, x may also contain up to J-1 alternative specific constants (ASCs) 
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capturing the residual mean influences of the unobserved effects on choice associated with 
their respective alternatives; where x takes the value 1 for the alternative under consideration 
or zero otherwise.  
The utility specification in Equation (2) is flexible in that it allows for the possibility that 
different respondents may have different marginal utilities for each attribute being modelled. 
Such differences are accounted for in the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model by 
allowing one or more parameter to be specified as  
 
 
nk k k nkz     (3) 
 
where 
k represents the mean or some other measure of central tendency for the 
distribution of marginal utilities held by the sampled population and k represents a deviation 
from the mean (or other measure of central tendency) parameter and nkz an individual 
specific (set of) draw(s) from some predefined distribution (e.g., ~ (0,1)nkz N ). 
Given that the location for nkz is unknown for any specific individual, it is necessary to take 
multiple pseudo random or quasi-random draws for each individual from nkz  for each 
individual decision maker during estimation. For this reason, the parameter weights given in 
Equation (3) are typically referred to as random parameters. 
 
2.2 Models Allowing for Scale Heterogeneity  
 
The typical normalization of n to one in Equation (2) fails to formally recognize the 
possibility of scale heterogeneity, although models allowing for randomly distributed ASCs 
or error components do account for scale heterogeneity in a limited sense. Models allowing 
for randomly distributed ASCs are equivalent to allowing for heteroskedastic error terms with 
one interpretation being that this heteroskedasticity represents different scale across 
individuals. Similarly, error components may also be interpreted as the modeling of different 
scale across sampled individuals as the estimated parameter estimates are the standard 
deviation parameters linked directly to the unobserved influences of choice. Unfortunately, 
randomly distributed ASCs may appear in only J-1 alternatives and whilst multiple error 
component terms may appear in all J alternatives, any given error component may only be 
associated with J-1 of the modelled alternatives. As such, randomly distributed ASCs and 
error components apply different scale weights to each of the alternatives. This is strictly not 
the same as n which impacts upon all J alternatives equally. As such, differences in scale 
across individuals cannot adequately be captured by the MMNL model as the scale 
differences in this model are not only captured across individuals, but simultaneously across 
individuals and (subsets) of alternatives.   
To accommodate both scale and preference heterogeneity, Keane (2006) proposed the 
generalised multinomial logit (GMNL) model. First operationalised by Fiebig et al. (2010) 
and subsequently by Greene and Hensher (2010), the marginal utility for attribute k for the 
GMNL may be represented as Equation (4).   
 
  1 ,nk n k nk n nk            (4) 
 
 
where   takes any value between 0 and 1 and where 
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 
e .n
v
n
 


  (5) 
 
In Equation (5),   denotes a mean parameter of scale variance,   a parameter of 
unobserved scale heterogeneity and 
nv  a standard normal distribution representing the 
unobserved scale heterogeneity.  
 
Ignoring n for the present, in the extreme case where   takes the value 0, Equation (4) 
will collapse to 
 
   ,nk n k nk      (6) 
 
suggesting that scale impacts equally upon both the mean (or central location) and standard 
deviation (or spread) parameters. Fiebig et al. (2010) refer to this model as GMNL2. At the 
other extreme, when   equals 1, Equation (4) collapses to 
 
 ,nk n k nk      (7) 
 
suggesting that scale impacts only upon the mean (or central location) parameter. Fiebig et 
al. (2010) refer to this model as GMNL1. Values of   between 0 and 1 suggest that scale 
impacts both the mean (or central location) and standard deviation parameters but to different 
extents. 
Returning to n , if n is estimated to take the value 1, then the marginal utilities obtained 
from the model will collapse to the MMNL estimates given in Equation (3). If all nk  
simultaneously equal 0, then the model collapses to a scaled version of the MNL model 
(which Fiebig et al. (2010) refer to as the SMNL model), such that the marginal utilities 
obtained from the model are 
 
 ,nk n k    (8) 
 
  
 
whilst if 1n   and all 0,nk   then the model collapses to the MNL model. 
 
2.3 Operationalising the GMNL Model  
 
To estimate the GMNL or any of its restricted forms, maximum simulated likelihood 
estimation is used. In estimating the model however, a number of difficulties must first be 
overcome. Firstly, both Fiebig et al. (2010) and Greene and Hensher (2010) note that   and 
n  in Equation (5) cannot be separately identified. Under the assumption that scale 
heterogeneity will be lognormally distributed and ignoring preference heterogeneity for the 
present, Fiebig et al. (2010) and Greene and Hensher (2010) both argue that  
 
 
2
2
22 .nE e



 
  
      (9) 
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In order for the model to be identified, it is necessary to normalise 
2 1.nE     In order to 
accomplish this normalisation, both Fiebig et al. (2010) and Greene and Hensher (2010) set 
2
2

  such that Equation (5) becomes 
 
 
2
2
e .
nv
n



 
  
   (10) 
  
 
To ensure that scale remains positive, the model is fit in terms of   such that  
 
  e ,

   (11) 
 
where   is unrestricted. 
 
In estimation, depending on the estimates of   and in turn ,  extremely large values of n  
can occur depending on the values drawn from .nv  When such large values are observed, 
software overflows may occur and the estimator becomes unstable. As such, rather than use a 
standard normal distribution for ,nv  Fiebig et al. (2010) employ truncated standard normal 
distribution with truncation at ±2. In taking this approach, any draw from outside this range is 
rejected and a new draw taken in its place. Rather than use a truncated standard normal 
distribution with an acceptance or rejection of the random parameter draw approach, Greene 
and Hensher (2009) propose a method to directly restrict the values of nv to be between 
±1.96. This is achieved by setting  1 0.025 0.95nr nrv U
   where the value of nv for the r
th
 
draw is calculated from the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function,  1 .  given a random draw from a standard uniform distribution bounded by 0 and 
1. Assuming that draw r from nrU  is 0, then the probability is transformed to 0.025. At the 
other bound, a draw of 1 for nrU corresponds to a probability of 0.975. As such,  
1 .  will 
be naturally bounded at ±1.96. For the current paper, we utilize the approach suggested by 
Greene and Hensher (2009). 
 
Finally, in order to impose the limits on ,    is reparameterised in terms of  such that  
 
 ,
1
e
e


 

 (12) 
  
where   is unrestricted in both sign and magnitude. This ensures that   will be bounded 
within the 0-1 range.  
 
 
3   Minimum Information Group Inference    
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Predominant empirical constraints in urban freight studies led to the investigation of 
alternative ways to make behavioural inferences for interdependent decision makers within 
discrete choice analysis. The minimum information group inference (MIGI) method was 
identified within the study yielding the empirical data analysed herein to obtain desired 
behavioural estimates. MIGI enables the analyst to model the influence structures within 
decision-making groups, such as the freight transport buyer-seller dyads of key interest 
within this research application (see Hensher and Puckett (2005) and Puckett et al. (2006) for 
a detailed justification), by inferring the effects of interactivity based on the stated 
willingness of respondents to concede toward the preferences of the other member of their 
respective sampled groups.  
MIGI models use SC experiments that augment the standard SC format to incorporate an 
interactive setting within an experiment that is administered to an individual respondent. As 
with interactive agency choice experiments (IACEs – see Brewer and Hensher, 2000), each 
respondent within a sampled group is given a set of identical choice sets. The resulting choice 
observations are coordinated across respondents and analysed to infer the effects of 
interdependency among the sample of interest, without requiring direct interaction among 
respondents. That is, the effects of interactive agency are inferred ex post, by projecting 
group outcomes based upon the preference rankings given by respondents within an 
algorithm designed to coordinate these rankings. 
Similar to an IACE, MIGI experiments are framed in terms of an interactive setting, within 
which respondents are asked to indicate their preferences among the given alternatives. 
Specifically, MIGI experiments prompt respondents to indicate how they would rank the 
alternatives if they had to attempt to reach agreement with the other member(s) of the 
sampled group. Importantly, the ranking process includes the option of denoting an 
alternative as unacceptable, to avoid inferring agreement outcomes that would not likely be 
observed under direct interaction. In other words, allowing respondents to indicate that they 
would not concede toward other respondent(s) to a specified degree within a given choice set 
preserves the potential to infer non-agreement outcomes for a sampled group. 
Unlike IACEs, MIGI does not involve an iterative process in which respondents are 
presented with information about the preferences of the other respondent(s) in the group and 
given the opportunity to revise their preferences. Rather, the influence of each respondent in a 
sampled group is inferred through the coordination of the preference rankings given by each 
respondent in a particular sampled group for a particular choice set. Influence is hypothesized 
to be represented within the preference rankings, in that respondents who are relatively more 
willing to accept less favourable alternatives are modelled as though they would be willing to 
offer relatively more concession within a direct interaction with the other group member(s). 
That is, the preference rankings themselves are indicative of the levels of concession the 
respondent would offer when interacting with the other member(s) of the group. 
Utilising the preference rankings of each respondent in a sample group, group preferences 
and influence structures are estimated through ―power models‖. As shown below, the power 
models offer a means of quantifying group influence structures consistent with the manner 
proposed by Dosman and Adamowicz (2003). MIGI analysis builds on the econometric 
structure offered by Dosman and Adamowicz, enabling the analyst to estimate attribute-
specific measures of influence. This is an important behavioural step, in that it allows the 
analyst to gauge the degree to which each type of decision maker holds influence over each 
attribute in consideration by the group. This proposition should be tested rather than assume 
that one type of decision maker holds the same degree of relative influence over all aspects of 
the decision or relationship in question. 
The first stage of econometric analysis in MIGI modelling involves the estimation of 
individual preferences for each agent type. Independent preferences are established by 
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modelling the choices of the most-preferred alternative for each respondent as a function of 
the attribute levels for each alternative and the contextual effects corresponding to each 
choice set. That is, despite the interdependent nature of the experiment, standard independent 
preferences are not only informative outputs on their own, but also offer a basis for 
comparison with group preferences. 
The behavioural process assumes that each agent q acts as if he or she is a utility maximiser 
when choosing a most-preferred alternative j in a choice set p faced by all members of a 
sampled group g. The base utility expressions (i.e., without any interaction effects or direct 
covariate effects) are of the general form:  
 
 qj j qjU  =  +  *  + , 
'
qk jkβ x  (13) 
 
where Uqj represents the utility derived by q from j, j represents an alternative-specific 
component of utility (if the design includes either labelled alternatives, or if one wishes to 
distinguish structurally between the reference alternative and stated choice alternatives),  xjk 
is a vector of design attributes associated with agent i and alternative j,  qk is the 
corresponding vector of marginal (dis)utility parameters (treated as random parameters if 
allowed to vary across q), j is an alternative-specific constant, and qj represents the 
(potentially individual-specific) unobserved effects. 
At this point in the analysis, independent utility estimates have been obtained for each 
respondent in the sample, and a range of group choices have been projected for each choice 
set commonly faced by each group. With this information, group preferences may be 
estimated using a procedure that is consistent with empirical modelling structures that can be 
utilised for the analysis of interactive agency SC data or RP data (Dosman and Adamowicz, 
2003; Hensher and Knowles, 2007). That is, for a given choice set, the projected chosen 
alternative of the group is compared to the unchosen alternatives in order to estimate a vector 
of attribute-specific power measures, qk. 
To accomplish this, estimates of the individual preference parameters for respondents in a 
group are carried forward as constant exogenous terms into the following power model and 
multiplied by the corresponding attribute levels for each of the K attributes in each alternative 
j in choice set p faced by all respondents q in group g. For each simulated group interaction 
gp, the alternative designated as the choice is the group choice projected using a choice 
coordination algorithm. The previously-estimated independent marginal utilities derived by 
each q in each j, the vector of attribute levels in each alternative xjk and any covariates of 
interest are the exogenous variables used to calculate the vector qk, which, along with any 
alternative-specific constants are the only free parameters in the model.  Whilst the most 
general two-agent case is offered here, this calculation can be augmented through the 
inclusion of interaction terms and additional respondents: 
 
11 11 11U  =  + ( * )  * + ((  ) * )  *  +  
' '
qk qk 1k qk q'k 1kx 1- x     
... 
1J 1J 1JU  =  + ( * )  * + ((  ) * )  *  +  
' '
qk qk 1k qk q'k Jkx 1- x                             (14) 
... 
JJ JJ JJU  =  + ( * )  * + ((  ) * )  *  +  
' '
qk qk Jk qk q'k Jkx 1- x    , 
 
where Ujm is the estimated utility the group g derives from the joint choice of alternative j 
by agent q and alternative m by agent q' in simulated group interaction gp, represents an 
alternative-specific utility component for the joint choice alternative, qk*qk represents a 
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vector of the product of relative influence measures for a focal agent type and the 
independent marginal utility derived by q for attribute k in j, xjk represents the vector of levels 
of each k present in j, ((1-qk)*q'k)' represents a vector of the product of relative influence 
measures for the other agent (1-qk) and the independent marginal utility derived by q' for k in 
m, xmk represents the vector of levels of each k present in m, and jm represents the 
unobserved effects for the joint choice alternative. 
The final decision of a group should involve either agreement across all members, or 
impasse, which is likely to result in a continuation of the status quo. When restricting the 
analysis to cases of agreement or impasse, the model reduces to the subset of Equation (14) in 
which the choices made by both decision makers are coincident (i.e., each agent chooses the 
same alternative j). We refer to this context as group equilibrium, under which one can 
estimate influence structures under cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes. 
The econometric analysis focuses on a pair of power models that reflect the relative power 
structure present when a given agent type (herein a transport or a shipper) offers concession 
toward the preferences of the other agent. For example, in the transporter concession power 
model, we present estimates of the influence structure present when transporters offer a 
degree of concession they state they are willing to offer toward the first preferences of 
shippers. Likewise, in the shipper concession power model, we present estimates of the 
influence structure present when shippers offer a degree of concession they state they are 
willing to offer toward the first preferences of transporters. Analysing influence structures in 
the two most extreme cases of concession, the preference data allow us to infer (i.e., when 
decision makers are willing to accept the first preference of the other decision maker in their 
respective groups) estimates of a range of relative power, within which one would expect to 
find corresponding point estimates if direct interaction between agents could be observed. 
The power measures for agents q (qk) and q' (1-qk) sum to unity for each attribute k, 
making comparisons of influence across agent types straightforward. If the two power 
measures are equal for a given attribute k (i.e., qk = (1 - qk) = 0.5), then group choice 
equilibrium is not governed by a dominant agent with respect to attribute k. In other words, 
regardless of the power structure governing other attributes, agent types q and q' tend to reach 
perceptively fair compromises when bridging the gap in their preferences for k. If the power 
measures are significantly different across agent types (e.g., qk >> (1 - qk)), then qk  gives a 
direct measure of the dominance of one agent type over the other with respect to attribute k, 
as qk increases, so does the relative power held by agent type q over q' for k. 
For example, in a freight distribution chain, the power measures may reveal that one agent 
type tends to get its way with regard to monetary concerns, whereas the other agent type 
tends to get its way with regard to concerns for levels of service. These relationships can be 
examined further within subsets of agent groups (by decomposition of the random parameter 
specification of qk), in order to reveal deviations from the inferred behaviour at the sample 
level that may be present for a particular type of relationship. 
It is important to note that the range of power measures is unbounded. That is, the only 
constraint on the power measures is that they sum to one across members of a group. Hence, 
it is possible to observe power measures either less than zero or greater than one. This is 
straightforward, in that a (0,1) bound is excessively restrictive for group decision making, 
especially for cases of trade-offs across fixed attribute bundles. The limited set of pre-
specified trade-offs may make it necessary for a decision maker to offer more than requested 
with respect to one attribute in order to reach agreement on an alternative. Therefore, one 
may observe a tendency for a given type of decision maker to offer greater concession toward 
the preferences of another type of decision maker for a given attribute than the initial 
discrepancy in preferences between the decision makers, resulting in an estimated power 
measure outside of the (0, 1) range. 
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The distribution of power measures across a given set of decision makers can be 
decomposed, and hence explained, by both objective and subjective descriptors of the 
relationship between members of groups within a sample. The mixed logit model, 
implemented within MIGI analysis, allows the analyst to model relative influence with 
respect to a given attribute as a function of characteristics within the relationship between 
interdependent decision makers. Objective descriptors include tangible factors such as 
measures of market power and the length of the relationship, whereas subjective descriptors 
include attitudinal statements about the importance of elements within the relationship and 
the effectiveness of the relationship in achieving those elements. 
The specific algorithm for coordinating the choices of group members within the power 
models is straightforward. Within the power model of concession by agents of type q, the 
group choice is specified as the first preference of the respondent of type q' if the respondent 
of type q stated that he or she was willing to accept that alternative as a group choice 
outcome. If the alternative is unacceptable to the respondent of type q, the group choice is 
specified as a non-cooperative outcome; in this empirical exercise, the non-cooperative case 
is represented by maintaining the status quo (i.e., the RP alternative). This process is repeated 
for all power models representing the relative concession a decision maker is willing to offer 
toward the preferences of another decision maker. To estimate the relative power measures 
qk in each concession model, group choice observations are projected for each choice set 
(including choice set p, for which the group choice is designated as 3), with the independent 
utility estimates qjk and q'mk carried forward from the first modelling stage, and with the 
attribute levels xjk and xmk set equal to those faced in choice set p for both choice 
observations. 
The power measures that result from estimating the group choice outcome utility functions 
highlight the process of concession required when agents with non-coincident preferences 
attempt to reach group choice equilibrium. That is, while the choice coordination algorithm is 
the mechanism by which group choice is projected in the model, the information that seeds 
the algorithm in turn allows the analyst to project the degree to which one agent type tends to 
get its way for a given attribute. Ultimately, although the analyst does not directly observe the 
interaction of two agents, the analyst has the ability to infer the process by which differing 
preferences converge toward group preference equilibrium. 
 
4   Empirical Data 
 
A 2004 study of road freight stakeholders in Sydney, Australia centred on capturing 
information about independent and interdependent preferences of carriers and shippers in the 
presence of a (hypothetical) distance-based road pricing system. Consistent with other freight 
studies, the predominant empirical constraints in the study were: (a) a small population from 
which to draw; (b) a limited research budget; and (c) difficulties in gaining the cooperation of 
freight stakeholders. A limited number of agents to sample (i.e., freight firms and their clients 
under contracts involving urban goods movement) requires optimisation on two counts: (1) 
recruiting a sufficient proportion of the population for the sample and (2) obtaining a 
sufficient number of choice observations for each respondent. A minimum information group 
inference (MIGI) experiment was chosen to allow for a relatively larger sample than a stated 
choice experiment involving direct interaction between sampled group members due to the 
relative ease of recruiting participants; that is, no temporal coordination of respondents was 
required. 
The empirical procedure began by administering the experiment to representatives of 
freight firms. Centred on a CAPI survey with a d-optimal experimental design (discussed in 
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Puckett et al., 2007), the MIGI experiment involved three distinct procedures: (1) non-stated-
choice questions intended to capture the relevant deliberation attributes and other contextual 
effects; (2) choice menus corresponding to an interactive (i.e., freight-contract-based) setting; 
and (3) questions on the attribute processing strategies enacted by respondents within each 
choice set. 
After a sampled respondent from a freight firm completed the survey, a client of a freight 
firm matching the classification offered by the respondent was recruited and given a survey 
involving the identical series of choice sets faced by the corresponding freight firm. 
 The levels and ranges of the attributes were chosen to reflect a range of coping strategies 
under a hypothetical distance-based road user charging regime. The reference alternative 
within each choice set for respondents from freight firms is created using the details specified 
by the respondent for the recent freight trip. In all cases except for the variable charges, the 
attribute levels for each of the SC alternatives are pivoted from the levels of the reference 
alternative, as detailed below. The levels are expressed as deviations from the reference level, 
which is the exact value specified in the corresponding non-SC questions, unless noted:  
1. Free-flow time: -50%, -25%, 0, +25%, +50%  
2. Slowed-down time: -50%, -25%, 0, +25%, +50%  
3. Waiting time at destination: -50%, -25%, 0, +25%, +50%  
4. Probability of on-time arrival: -50%, -25%, 0, +25%, +50%, with the resulting 
value rounded to the nearest 5% (e.g., a reference value of 75% reduced by 50% 
would yield a raw figure of 37.5%, which would be rounded to 40%). 
5. Fuel cost: -50%, -25%, 0, +25%, +50% (representing changes in fuel taxes of -100%, 
-50%, 0, +50%, +100%)  
6. Distance-based charges: -50%, -25%, 0, +25%, +50% around a base of 50 percent of 
the fuel cost (i.e., 100 percent of fuel taxes). 
Respondents were asked to assume that, for each of the choice sets given, the same goods 
need to be carried for the same client, subject to the same constraints faced when the 
reference trip was undertaken. The specific choice task on the initial screen is, 'If your 
organization and the client had to reach agreement on which alternative to choose, what 
would be your order of preference among alternatives?' Respondents are asked to provide a 
choice for every alternative. The available options for each alternative are: (Name of the 
alternative) is: My 1st choice; My 2nd choice; My 3rd choice; Not acceptable. At least one of 
the alternatives must be indicated as a first choice, which was not found to be restrictive, 
given that the reference alternative represents the status quo, which was clearly acceptable in 
the market. 
 The resulting estimation sample, after controlling for outliers and problematic respondent 
data, includes 114 transporters and 108 shippers. The transporters response rate was 45% 
whereas that of the shippers was 72%. 
 
5   Empirical Results 
 
5.1   Independent Preference Estimates 
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Our empirical exercise centres on a comparison of MIGI group influence measures when 
accounting for scale and preference heterogeneity within the GMNL model versus the mixed 
logit estimates found in Hensher and Puckett (2008). As discussed in Section 3, MIGI 
involves a two-stage process that begins with the estimation of independent preferences for 
each agent type within the model (i.e., transporters and shippers). The model selected in this 
application includes six attributes (and transformations of attributes) specified as random 
parameters, distributed triangularly with spread equal to the mean: total travel time, waiting 
time, the probability of on-time arrival, the freight rate, the proportion of variable charges 
within the freight rate, and fuel cost. The data were rank-exploded, yielding 743 observations 
for transporters (from 114 respondents facing four choice sets of three alternatives each) and 
1550 observations for shippers (from 108 respondents facing eight choice sets of three 
alternatives each). 
 
Table 1 summarises the model outputs relating to the preferences of transporters and 
shippers: 
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Table 1: Independent Agent GMNL Models 
 Transporters Shippers 
  Par. (t-ratio) Par. (t-ratio) 
Random Parameters 
Total Travel Time -0.010 (-4.54) -0.054 (-38.13) 
Waiting Time 0.007 (1.30) -0.028 (-14.46) 
Probability of On-Time Arrival 0.069 (7.20) 0.075 (23.65) 
Freight Rate 0.017 (7.96) -0.070 (-76.05) 
Variable Charge/Freight Rate -0.185 (-5.50) -0.037 (-4.03) 
Fuel Cost -0.030 (-9.34) -0.021 (-13.31) 
Non-Random Parameters 
Constant (RP) 0.846 (5.49) 0.671 (6.57) 
Constant (SP1) 0.006 (0.05) 0.164 (1.49) 
Variance Parameter in Scale 
Variance Parameter in Scale (τ) 1.213 (6.81) 1.000 (23.22) 
Weighting Parameter Gamma 
Gamma Parameter (γ) 0.509 (2.79) 0.500 (6.81) 
Sigma Parameters 
Sample Mean 0.808 - 0.870 - 
Sample Std. Dev. 0.886 - 0.779 - 
Model Fits 
LL(ASC) -631.297 -1291.633 
LL(β) -526.618 -921.067 
Pseudo ρ2(ASC) 0.166 0.287 
Number of Respondents 114 108 
Number of Observations 743 1550 
 
Shippers appear more sensitive to travel-related attributes than transporters. This is an 
interesting behavioural result that may underscore the distinct roles that freight transport 
activity represents for customers versus providers. At a fundamental level, transporters are in 
the business of travelling (whether in free-flow or slowed-down conditions) and waiting at 
loading and unloading points; hence, whilst marginal improvements in travel efficiency are 
likely to increase utility, the actual activity of carrying or waiting with goods offers less 
disutility than for customers who are paying for this activity (and who are unable to utilise the 
goods being carried until they are no longer being carried). Indeed, transporters not only 
show a much lower mean marginal disutility to travel time (-0.1 versus –0.54 for shippers), 
but also demonstrate some possible positive utility of waiting time at the levels present in the 
survey (0.007 with a t-value of 1.3, versus –0.028 for shippers). This is sensible if 
transporters are being paid for the time spent waiting or if the quantity of waiting time is not 
significant enough to disturb subsequent activity. Of course, for no attribute are the roles 
more diametrically opposed than for the freight rate, with shippers showing a larger disutility 
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for a marginal dollar paid than the utility gained by transporters for that same dollar (0.017 
for transporters versus –0.07 for shippers).  
Transporters and shippers demonstrate quite similar preferences for improving reliability 
(parameter of 0.069 for transporters versus 0.075 for shippers). This may indicate that 
transporters and shippers could have relatively low barriers to working together to enact 
strategies to improve the reliability of freight travel relative to other attributes of distribution 
strategies.  
Transporters reveal stronger sensitivities than shippers to direct operating costs of travel, 
which is intuitive. Transporters are much more sensitive to the magnitude of distance-based 
charges relative to the freight rate than shippers (mean marginal disutility of –0.185 for 
transporters versus –0.037 for shippers). This is consistent with shippers’ relatively strong 
sensitivities to travel characteristics if they view the charges as offering sufficiently improved 
levels-of-service (i.e., value for money). Conversely, for transporters, any charges that cannot 
be passed along to customers may not represent the same improvement. Fuel cost offers 
disutility to transporters and shippers, the latter of whom may acknowledge the correlation 
between fuel cost and both expected freight rates and travel times (i.e., ceteris paribus, a 
relatively quick trip in free-flow conditions should take less time, burn less fuel and hence 
cost less than other trips). Still, the direct disutility for transporters of spending money on 
fuel, along with corresponding operating costs relating to trips under lower fuel efficiencies, 
is connected to higher disutilities than for shippers. 
Turning to the functional form of the GMNL model, the models of transporter and shipper 
preferences yield similar gamma parameters at or near 0.5. Returning to Equation (4), these 
estimates imply that for both transporters and shippers scale impacts the mean and standard 
deviation estimates in different ways (but in the same functional form across the two models). 
As such, the flexibility of the GMNL model in capturing information on scale heterogeneity 
may offer significant improvements in representing transporter and shipper choice behaviour 
above alternative model specifications. 
 
5.2   Shipper Concession Model 
 
We now turn to model outputs from the power models discussed in Section 3. The shipper 
concession and transporter concession models represent our estimated outer bounds of 
ranges of relative influence held by transporters and shippers over the attributes within the 
empirical study. Each model projects the group choice for a given choice set as either: (a) the 
first preference of the respondent toward whom concession is offered by the focal agent type, 
if the focal agent stated he or she is willing to accept that alternative as the group choice or 
(b) the RP alternative, if the focal agent was unwilling to accept the other decision maker's 
first preference as the group choice. For example, within the shipper concession model, the 
group choice for a given choice set is projected as the first preference of the transporter if the 
shipper stated he or she is willing to accept that alternative as the group choice. If the shipper 
stated that the alternative is unacceptable, no new strategy would be guaranteed to be a 
consensus choice, and hence the status quo (i.e., the RP alternative) would be maintained. 
The attribute-specific power measures resulting from each of these models reflect the 
relative concession each decision maker is willing to offer. That is, the models represent the 
degree to which each type of decision maker is willing to accommodate the preferences of the 
other decision maker when their first preferences do not coincide. This is represented 
empirically through power measures that are considered in reference to 0.5, a value that 
indicates that each decision maker is willing to offer the same level of concession with 
respect to the attribute in question. Values significantly above (below) 0.5 indicate that 
transporters (shippers) hold significant power relative to shippers (transporters), and hence 
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are likely to achieve group choice equilibria that preserve a relatively greater proportion of 
their own preferences. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the results of the shipper concession model: 
 
Table 2: Shipper Concession Model 
Random Parameters (Distributed Triangularly) 
 Value t-ratio (for power measures, 
relative to 0 and 0.5, respectively) 
Total Travel Time (Mean) 0.936 6.92, 3.22 
Total Travel Time (Std. Dev.) 0.936^ 6.92 
Variable Charge/Freight Rate (Mean) 1.701 2.85, 2.01 
Var. Charge/Freight Rate (Std. Dev.) 2.720 2.02 
Prob. of On-Time Arrival (Mean) 2.716 4.72, 3.85 
Prob. of On-Time Arrival (Std. Dev.) 2.716^ 4.72 
Non-Random Parameters 
Constant (RP) 1.454 6.02 
Constant (SP1) -0.179 -0.66 
Waiting Time 0.839 3.35, 1.35 
Freight Rate 0.968 22.62, 10.94 
Fuel Cost 1.327 9.15, 5.71 
Variance Parameter in Scale 
Variance Parameter in Scale (τ) 0.769 3.75 
Weighting Parameter Gamma 
Gamma Parameter (γ) 0.691 0.76 
Sigma Parameters 
Sample Mean 0.924 - 
Sample Std Dev. 0.456 - 
Model Fits 
LL(ASC) -470.21 
LL(β) -255.02 
Pseudo ρ2 0.458 
Number of Sampled Pairs 107 
Number of Observations 428 
^Spread constrained as equal to the mean 
 
 15 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Individual-Specific Power Measures (Shipper Concession, 
GMNL)  
 Travel Time On-Time Arrival Variable Charges 
Mean 0.86 2.53 1.56 
Std. Dev. 0.36 0.90 0.71 
Minimum 0.19 1.11 -0.39 
Maximum  2.60 7.46 4.45 
 
The shipper concession model reveals that shippers are potentially willing to accommodate 
the preferences of transporters with respect to many attributes within the analysis. The power 
measures that infer the greatest influence for transporters relates to the probability of on-time 
arrival, waiting time, the freight rate and fuel cost. Implications with respect to on-time 
arrival may be obscured by the close magnitudes of independent preferences across the two 
groups, however. It is interesting to observe the relative willingness to accommodate 
transporters’ preferences over fuel cost, as optimising fuel consumption would be an 
objective directly within transporters’ expertise and motivations. Travel time and variable 
charges involve a diverse range of power structures under concession by shippers; that is, 
some, but not all, shippers are willing to accommodate the preferences of transporters with 
respect to travel time and variable charges.  
The estimated gamma parameter implies that the model form approaches the GMNL2 form 
as identified by Fiebig et al. (2010). That is, scale effects appear to have impacted the mean 
and standard deviation parameters, although not quite equally. 
We can now compare the estimated distributions of power measures in the shipper 
concession model with those from the mixed logit model in Hensher and Puckett (2008), as 
shown in Table 4: 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Individual-Specific Power Measures (Shipper Concession, Mixed 
Logit)  
 Travel Time On-Time Arrival Freight Rate Variable Charges Fuel Cost 
Mean 0.14 1.10 0.57 2.82 2.05 
Std. Dev. 1.25 0.29 0.10 0.85 1.10 
Minimum -8.63 0.04 0.37 -1.31 -1.26 
Maximum  1.17 1.93 0.98 4.00 8.49 
 
Beyond the limitation that the original power model did not include waiting time, some 
important distinctions emerge across the two models. Firstly, the estimated ranges of power 
values are commonly much larger in the mixed logit case. Secondly, the specific behavioural 
implications of the mixed logit shipper concession model are not coincident with those from 
the GMNL model. Across the two models, shippers are represented as offering strong 
concession to the preferences of transporters with respect to on-time arrival, variable charges 
and fuel cost. However, the degree of relative power held by shippers over travel time and the 
freight rate appears to be much smaller in the GMNL model. Furthermore, after accounting 
for scale heterogeneity, the GMNL model does not identify the same degree of heterogeneity 
in the range of power measures. That is, incorporating scale heterogeneity in the model leads 
to a restricted range of attributes over which there appears to be heterogeneity in relative 
influence across groups; in the GMNL model, no significant heterogeneity was identified 
with respect to power over the freight rate or fuel cost. 
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5.3   Transporter Concession Model 
 
To make inferences with respect to the power structures between transporters and shippers 
without directly observing their interactions, the analyst can contrast the results from the 
shipper concession model with those from the transporter concession model (i.e., the model 
accounting for the degree to which transporters are willing to accommodate the first 
preferences of shippers). We now turn to the results of the GMNL transporter concession 
model, as summarized in Tables 5 and 6: 
 
Table 5: Transporter Concession Model 
Random Parameters (Distributed Triangularly) 
 Value t-ratio (for power measures, 
relative to 0 and 0.5, respectively) 
Total Travel Time (Mean) -0.756 -4.79, -7.95 
Total Travel Time (Std. Dev.) 1.949 4.22 
Variable Charge/Freight Rate (Mean) 0.809 1.31, 0.50 
Var. Charge/Freight Rate (Std. Dev.) 3.566 2.64 
Fuel Cost (Mean) -0.604 -5.18, -9.54 
Fuel Cost (Std. Dev.) 0.604^ 5.18 
Non-Random Parameters 
Constant (RP) 1.256 4.24 
Constant (SP1) -0.665 -1.77 
Waiting Time -0.597 -2.43, -4.79 
Prob. of On-Time Arrival -0.678 -4.86, -4.33 
Freight Rate -0.103 -4.69, -27.43 
Variance Parameter in Scale 
Variance Parameter in Scale (τ) 0.546 2.15 
Weighting Parameter Gamma 
Gamma Parameter (γ) 0.436 0.41 
Sigma Parameters 
Sample Mean 0.962 - 
Sample Std Dev. 0.462 - 
Model Fits 
LL(ASC) -470.21 
LL(β) -284.99 
Pseudo ρ2(ASC) 0.394 
Number of Sampled Pairs 107 
Number of Observations 428 
^Spread constrained as equal to the absolute value of the mean 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Individual-Specific Power Measures 
(Transporter Concession, GMNL) 
 Travel Time Variable Charges Fuel Cost 
Mean -0.77 0.79 -0.59 
Std. Dev. 0.56 0.65 0.18 
Minimum -2.90 -1.95 -1.36 
Maximum 0.51 2.14 -0.29 
 
The transporter concession model reveals that transporters are potentially willing to 
accommodate the preferences of shippers with respect to every attribute, with the key 
exception of variable charges. The breadth of attributes over which transporters are willing to 
offer concession is supported by a strong magnitude of concession. That is, not only are 
transporters willing to offer strong concession towards shippers’ preferences on average for 
all attributes except for variable charges (i.e., means of distributions and fixed coefficients of 
power measures below zero), but the estimated power measures are generally in the range 
reflecting total concession for these attributes. Variable charges, on the other hand, are an 
attribute over which transporters appear highly resistant to offering concession. Transporters’ 
stated willingness to concede demonstrates that transporters are not generally willing to 
increase the proportion of variable charges they pay relative to the freight rate in response to 
the preferences of shippers. 
The estimated gamma parameter implies that the model form approaches the GMNL2 form 
as identified by Fiebig et al. (2010). That is, scale effects appear to have impacted the mean 
parameters similarly to the standard deviation parameters. 
We can now compare the estimated distribution of power measures in the transporter 
concession model with those from the mixed logit model in Hensher and Puckett (2008), as 
shown in Table 7: 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Individual-Specific Power Measures (Transporter Concession, 
Mixed Logit)  
 Travel Time On-Time Arrival Freight Rate Variable Charges Fuel Cost 
Mean 0.15 1.11 0.03 1.67 -0.12 
Std. Dev. 1.01 0.09 0.33 0.42 0.00 
Minimum -5.00 0.80 -0.13 -2.23 -0.13 
Maximum  2.35 1.58 0.74 2.51 -0.12 
 
As with the shipper concession model, the estimated ranges of some power values (travel 
time and variable charges) are much larger in the mixed logit case, with some values well 
away from the unit interval. The behavioural implications across the GMNL and mixed logit 
models are generally consistent, as well, with on-time arrival being the one exception; in the 
GMNL model, transporters appear willing to offer concession to the preferences of shippers. 
However, given the similar independent sensitivities to on-time arrival for transporters and 
shippers, this may simply be a difficult attribute over which to identify relative power (i.e., 
both transporters and shippers have similar motivations to optimise with respect to on-time 
arrival). Consistent with the shipper concession model, accounting for scale heterogeneity 
results in a restricted set of power measures over which significant heterogeneity is 
identified; whilst the mixed logit model identifies heterogeneity in relative power across each 
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attribute, the GMNL model does not identify significant heterogeneity with respect to power 
over on-time arrival or the freight rate. 
 
5.4   Comparison of Results under Shipper Concession and Transporter Concession 
 
Comparing the results from the shipper concession and transporter concession models 
enables inferences to be made about the range of power structures that are likely to be 
observed amongst transporters and shippers under variable charging. There are three main 
types of power structures that are likely to be observed at the variable level: relative power 
held by transporters, relative power held by shippers, and balanced power (either on average, 
with power depending upon relationship characteristics, or overall, with a general tendency 
for power to be balanced).  
Across the GMNL concession models, two types of relationships appear to dominate. 
Transporters appear to hold strong power with respect to variable charges, regardless of the 
degree of concession offered by either type of decision maker. This result is consistent with 
the results from the mixed logit model. However, in the mixed logit model, transporters were 
represented as having strong power over on-time arrival probability, which is not the case in 
the GMNL model; the similar estimated independent sensitivities for transporters and 
shippers within the GMNL model imply a broader range of cooperative outcomes that could 
be observed for on-time arrival. The ranges of group-specific power measures indicate that 
transporters may hold at least some degree of relative power over decisions impacting travel 
time, as well. 
Consistent with the mixed logit model, the GMNL model does not identify any particular 
attributes over which shippers are resistant to cooperating with transporters. Rather, waiting 
time, fuel cost, on-time arrival probability and the freight rate are identified by the GMNL 
power models as attributes over which a range of cooperative outcomes could be observed. 
Ultimately, the GMNL power models suggest that policy measures centred on the 
implementation of variable charges are likely to impact urban goods movement mainly 
through the influence of the preferences of transporters. That is, despite the interdependent 
nature of urban goods movement, transporters appear to hold power over the response of 
supply chains to a variable charging system. The GMNL model places a clear focus on 
heterogeneity in group dynamics with respect to both variable charges and travel time. 
Hence, strategies involving optimisation with respect to the transporter’s preferences for 
variable charges may not only be enacted in distinct ways across types of decision-making 
groups, but the relative benefits obtained in terms of travel time also do not appear to be 
uniform across groups. This, along with the general willingness of transporters and shippers 
to accommodate the preferences of their partners with respect to waiting time, on-time 
reliability, fuel cost if offered sufficient value for money (i.e., through the freight rate) 
indicates opportunities for shippers to secure agreeable outcomes when opting for strategies 
that benefit transporters through preferences for variable charges. 
 
6   Conclusions 
 
The comparison of GMNL and mixed logit model results within an interdependent 
decision-making context demonstrate how behavioural implications can be a direct function 
of the role of scale within econometric models. Assuming any particular fixed scale structure 
could lead to policy implications that are counter to those arising from another assumed scale 
structure. Given the likelihood that assumptions about scale, which itself is unobserved 
within some models, may be arbitrary and unnecessarily restrictive, this result is worth 
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further investigation within extant and future empirical applications. That is, there may be 
misleading policy outputs in both independent and interdependent applications that are a 
result of relationships between (misspecified) scale and preference estimates. 
The use of a flexible structure such as the GMNL model allows us to re-examine 
behavioural relationships by breaking apart the impact of scale from preference estimates 
within sophisticated models that account for preference heterogeneity. It appears to be a 
worthwhile exercise to confirm previously derived behavioural results from other models 
within GMNL models to improve our confidence in a range of model outputs, including 
pivotal elements such as willingness-to-pay. Whilst the application discussed herein focuses 
on group influence structures, the implications are by no means limited to group decision-
making. 
Fortunately, the comparison of GMNL and mixed logit results in this case did confirm the 
relative power that transporters appear to hold over variable charges. Hence, despite the 
potential for misspecification bias in relation to scale effects, the mixed logit model did 
identify the leading role that transporters stand to play in group responses to variable road-
user charging. 
Beneficial research would include re-examining extant studies into preference 
heterogeneity, both within and outside of urban freight studies, and for studies of independent 
and interdependent decision makers, by accounting for scale heterogeneity explicitly. The 
GMNL model offers an empirically straightforward tool for accomplishing this, requiring 
little further analyst input than standard mixed logit models. Not only would it beneficial to 
identify whether scale itself plays a significant role in existing behavioural models, but it may 
also be critical to identify whether some degree of preference heterogeneity present (or 
absent) in existing models is actually an artefact of unidentified scale heterogeneity. In a 
given application, such potential misspecification may be vital to confirm, especially in cases 
where appropriate policy depends upon knowledge of the degree to which some individuals 
or groups may be impacted differently to the population, in general.  
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